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I have tested a few existing anonymity proxies (A-proxies) available in the Internet. The goal was
to find out whether these systems filter all dangerous contents or not. I found a security hole that
is based on a mistake in the parsing algorithm.
I have tested the following systems:
System Result
http://www.anonymizer.com Not secure against the attack (May 06, 2000: fixed...,now secure!)
http://aixs.net/aixs/ Not secure against the attack
http://www.rewebber.com secure against the attack, flaw fixed on Feb. 18, 2000
http://ikt.inf.tu-dresden.de/~feder/cgi-bin
/a.cgi
secure against the attack (Dec 03, 2001: service no
longer available.)
Deutsche Fassung (ausführlicher)
The attack described below uncovers the IP address of a client to the server.
The security hole of the systems is based on the insufficent parsing of contents of cascading style
sheets.
The attack has been sucessful with Internet Explorer. Netscape Navigator does not recognize or
interpret the necessary tags yet. However, the new Seamonkey (see http://www.mozilla.org)
interprets the tag.
Assume the client requests a web page with the following content via an A-proxy:
<html>
<head>
<title>css test 2</title>
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="style.css" title="css">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<h1>css test 2</h1>
This is a list:
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<ul>
    <li> Item 1
    <li> Item 2
    <li> Item 3
</ul>
<p>
End.
</BODY>
</HTML>
The A-proxy loads the content from the server, parses all nested links, and adds a prefix in order
to load the nested contents via the proxy too.
Example: Anonymizer replaces the line
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="style.css" title="css">
by
<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
href="http://anon.free.anonymizer.com/http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~hannes
/atest/style.css" title="css">
Subsequently, the browser loads the stylesheet file via the anon proxy.
The stylesheet file style.css consists of the following content:
ul  { list-style-image:url(http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/dash.gif); }
This line contains a command that uncovers the IP address of the client. This command causes
that the bullets in lists created by the <ul> tag are replaced with a user defined graphic image
(here: http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/dash.gif).
The flaw of the A-proxies is that the stylesheet file is not sufficently parsed, and the address of
the user defined image is not prefixed with the A-Proxy. The embedded image is requested
directly from the client.
Thus, the client leaves his IP address to the server www.inf.tu-dresden.de and is uncovered.
More information on anonymity
http://www.inf.tu-dresden.de/~hf2/anon/
Our implementation of an A-proxy
Links to other systems
* * *
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